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Abstract
In the property rights approach to the theory of the rm (Hart, 1995), parties
bargain about whether or not to collaborate after non-contractible investments
have been made. Most contributions apply the regular Nash bargaining so-
lution. We explore the implications of using the generalized Nash bargaining
solution. A prominent nding regarding the suboptimality of joint ownership
turns out to be robust. However, in contrast to the standard property rights
model, it may well be optimal to give ownership to a party whose investments
are less productive, provided that this partys ex-post bargaining power is
relatively small.
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1 Introduction
The property rights approach (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore,
1990; Hart, 1995) is a cornerstone of the modern theory of the rm.1 When
contracts are incomplete, a partys incentives to make relationship-specic in-
vestments depend on the fraction of the investmentsreturns that the party
will be able to capture in future negotiations. Ownership over physical assets
matters, because ownership improves a partys position in future negotiations.
Specically, consider two parties, A and B, who can make non-contractible
investments in their human capital at date 1. At date 2, they can generate
a surplus using physical assets. At date 0, the parties agree on an ownership
structure over the assets, which determines the partiespayo¤s if they fail to
collaborate at date 2. Central results of the property rights approach are that
(i) joint ownership is suboptimal and (ii) the party whose investments are more
productive should be the owner.
In most contributions to the property rights approach, the date-2 negoti-
ations are modeled using the regular Nash bargaining solution. Hence, while
a partys bargaining position (i.e., its disagreement payo¤) depends on the
ownership structure, it is assumed that both parties have the same ex-post
bargaining power. In the present paper, we instead apply the generalized Nash
bargaining solution in order to explore how the implications regarding optimal
asset ownership change if the partiesex-post bargaining powers may di¤er.
It turns out that the insight that joint ownership can never be optimal is
robust. However, if party A has more ex-post bargaining power than party
B, then it may well be optimal to make party B owner of the physical assets,
even when party As investments are more productive. Hence, one of the most
1See Segal and Whinston (2010) for a recent literature review.
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prominent implications of the property rights approach can be overturned.
2 Bargaining position and bargaining power
In the literature on the property rights approach, there is sometimes some
confusion about how ownership inuences investment incentives.2 In general,
a partys date-2 payo¤ depends on two aspects. First, a partys bargaining
position is determined by the disagreement payo¤s (which depend on the own-
ership structure). Second, a partys ex-post bargaining power is given by the
share of the renegotiation surplus that it can capture (where the renegotiation
surplus is dened as the total surplus in the case of collaboration minus the to-
tal surplus in the case of disagreement). A central assumption of the property
rights approach is that the bargaining power is independent of the ownership
structure (see Hart, 1995, footnote 17).
In many models it is for simplicity assumed that both parties have the
same bargaining power  = 1=2 (see Hart, 1995). However, a growing num-
ber of papers allows for any bargaining power  2 [0; 1], see e.g. Farrell and
Gibbons (1995), Nöldeke and Schmidt (1998), Schmitz (2006), Antràs and
Staiger (2008), Ohlendorf (2009), Hoppe and Schmitz (2010), Ganglmair et
al. (2012), or Schmitz (2013). These papers are focused on di¤erent problems
(e.g., private information, sequential investments, public goods, or applications
to international trade, privatization, or law and economics), but do not explore
2See e.g. Farrell and Gibbons (1995, p. 315), who point out that investment incentives
are increasing in a partys ex-post bargaining power, which (as they point out in their
footnote 4) they incorrectly attributed to Grossman and Hart (1986) in an earlier version of
their paper. Indeed, in Grossman and Hart (1986) the ex post bargaining power is always
1/2, while ownership improves investment incentives because it inuences the disagreement
payo¤s.
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the implications of di¤erent bargaining powers for the central ndings in the
basic property rights setting as outlined by Hart (1995).
A simple non-cooperative bargaining game that leads to the generalized
Nash bargaining solution assumes that one party can make a take-it-or-leave-
it o¤er with probability , while the other party can make the o¤er with
probability 1   (see the appendix of Hart and Moore, 1999). If one models
the bargaining process following Rubinsteins (1982) alternating-o¤ers game,
then the bargaining power  can be derived endogenously depending on the
partiesrelative time preferences.3
The present contribution is also related to the work by De Meza and Lock-
wood (1998) and Chiu (1998), who nd that sometimes an agent with an
important investment decision should not own the assets he works with. How-
ever, these authors apply the outside-option principle to model the date-2
negotiations; i.e., they replace the split-the-di¤erence rule by the deal-me-out
solution.4
3In particular, a party has a larger bargaining power when it is relatively more patient. If
a party does not accept an o¤er and instead wants to make a countero¤er, then it must incur
the cost of waiting. The smaller the partys discount rate, the smaller is this cost. Thus,
being more patient confers greater bargaining power. See Muthoo (1999) for an excellent
textbook exposition.
4According to the deal-me-out solution, the parties split the total date-2 surplus 50:50
if each party gets at least its default payo¤ (otherwise, a party that would get less than its
default payo¤ gets its default payo¤, while the other party gets the residuum). In contrast,
we follow the standard property rights approach and assume that at date 2 the parties divide
the renegotiation surplus (i.e., the di¤erence between the total surplus given collaboration
and given disagreement). In the case of alternating-o¤ers bargaining, we thus assume that
the default payo¤s are inside options, while De Meza and Lockwood (1998) and Chiu (1998)
consider outside options (see Muthoo, 1999).
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3 The model
There are two parties, A and B. For example, party B might be the supplier of
an intermediate good, which party A can use to produce a nal good. At some
initial date 0, the parties agree on an ownership structure o 2 fA;B; Jg. In
the example, the owner has the control rights over the physical assets needed
to produce the intermediate good. Thus, A-ownership can be interpreted as
integration and B-ownership as non-integration, while o = J means that there
is joint ownership. In line with the property rights approach (see Hart, 1995),
we assume that the two parties will agree on the ownership structure that
maximizes their anticipated total surplus, which they can divide up-front by
suitable lump-sum payments.5
At date 1, parties A and B simultaneously make relationship-specic in-
vestments a  0 and b  0, respectively, which are observable but not con-
tractible. The investments are made in the partieshuman capital; i.e., party
As investment improves its ability to produce the nal good, while party Bs
investment improves its ability to produce the intermediate good. Let the
partiesinvestment costs be given by c(a) = 1
2
a2 and c(b) = 1
2
b2.
At date 2, the parties bargain about whether or not to collaborate.6 If the
parties agree to collaborate, then they together generate the date-2 surplus
a + b. The technology parameter  indicates whether party As investments
are more productive (0 <  < 1) or whether party Bs investments are more
5Since ex-ante bargaining determines only the division of the anticipated surplus, but not
its size, there is no need to specify the ex-ante bargaining powers of the two parties (which
in general may di¤er from their ex-post bargaining powers).
6Note that by assumption ex-ante it is not possible for the parties to commit to collaborate
ex-post. See Hart and Moore (1999) and Maskin and Tirole (1999) for discussions of the
incomplete contracting paradigm.
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productive ( > 1).
Remark 1 In a rst-best world, the parties would collaborate ex-post and the
total surplus would be given by S = a + b   c(a)   c(b). Hence, the rst-
best investment levels are aFB = 1 and bFB = . Note that the party whose
investments are more productive invests more.
In the incomplete contracting world, if the parties do not collaborate at
date 2, their payo¤s depend on the ownership structure as shown in Table 1.
Specically, if there is A-ownership, then in the case of disagreement party A
(who controls the physical assets) can produce the intermediate good without
party B. However, in this case party A can make the prot "a only, where
" > 0, while party B makes zero prot. Note that party A cannot make use of
partyBs investments, which were made in partyBs human capital. Moreover,
as party As investments are relationship-specic, it is assumed that " < 1, so
that the returns of party As investments are smaller in the absence of party
Bs human capital. Analogously, if there is B-ownership and disagreement,
then party B (who controls the assets) can make the prot "b by trading
with someone else, while party A makes zero prot. Finally, in case of joint
ownership each party has veto power over the use of the assets, so that both
partiesdisagreement payo¤s are zero (cf. Hart, 1995).
party A party B
o = A "a 0
o = B 0 "b
o = J 0 0
Table 1. The partiesdisagreement payo¤s at date 2.
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We model the outcome of the date-2 negotiations using the generalized
Nash bargaining solution, where  2 [0; 1] denotes party As bargaining power.
Hence, the parties will always collaborate and they agree on a transfer pay-
ment such that at date 2 each party gets its disagreement payo¤ plus a share
of the renegotiation surplus (i.e., the additional surplus that is generated by
collaboration). The shares are determined by the partiesbargaining powers.
Thus, in the case of integration (o = A), party As date-2 payo¤ is given by
uAA(a; b) = "a+ [a+ b  "a]
and party Bs date-2 payo¤ reads
uAB(a; b) = (1  )[a+ b  "a].
Analogously, in the case of non-integration (o = B), party As date 2-payo¤ is
uBA(a; b) = [a+ b  "b]
and party Bs date-2 payo¤ is
uBB(a; b) = "b+ (1  )[a+ b  "b].
Under joint ownership (o = J), the partiesdate-2 payo¤s are given by
uJA(a; b) = [a+ b]
and
uJB(a; b) = (1  )[a+ b].
We can now analyze the partiesinvestment incentives. Given ownership
structure o 2 fA;B; Jg, at date 1 party A chooses the investment level
ao = argmaxfuoA(a; b)  c(a)g
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and party B chooses the investment level
bo = argmaxfuoB(a; b)  c(b)g:
Thus, under A-ownership, the investment levels are given by aA =  +
(1   )" and bA = (1   ). Under B-ownership, the investment levels are
aB =  and bB = "+(1 ). Under joint ownership, the investment levels
are aJ =  and bJ = (1   ). Note that party As (party Bs) investment
incentives are increasing (decreasing) in party As ex-post bargaining power .
Lemma 1 The investment levels can be ranked as follows: aJ = aB  aA 
aFB and bJ = bA  bB  bFB.
At date 0, the parties agree on the ownership structure o 2 fA;B; Jg that
maximizes the total surplus So = ao + bo   c(ao)   c(bo). We can thus state
our main ndings as follows.
Proposition 1 (i) Joint ownership can never be strictly optimal.
(ii) If  = 1=2, then the party whose investment is more productive should
be the owner. Hence, it is optimal to choose o = A if  < 1 and o = B if
 > 1.
(iii) For any given technological (dis-)advantage  of party B, the ownership
structure o = A is optimal if party As bargaining power  is su¢ ciently small,
while o = B is optimal if party As bargaining power is su¢ ciently large.
Proof. (i) Note that the total surplus is concave and there is always un-
derinvestment with regard to the rst-best benchmark. Hence, joint ownership
can never be strictly better than ownership by party A (or by party B), since
party A (party B) invests more in the case of o = A (o = B) than in the case
of joint ownership, while the non-owners investment under o = A and o = B
is the same as under joint ownership.
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(ii) If  = 1=2, then SA   SB = " (2  ")  1  2 =8, which is strictly
positive if  < 1 and strictly negative if  > 1.
(iii) Note that So is continuous in . If  goes to 0, then SA goes to
2=2+ "(1  "=2), while SB goes to 2=2. Hence, regardless of , ownership by
party A is optimal if  is su¢ ciently small. Moreover, if  goes to 1, then SA
goes to 1=2, while SB goes to 1=2+ "2(1  "=2). Thus, ownership by party B
is optimal if  is su¢ ciently large. 
A well-known nding of the property rights approach is that joint owner-
ship is suboptimal when investments are in human capital.7 Proposition 1(i)
shows that this result is robust when we allow the partiesbargaining powers
to be di¤erent from 1=2. Proposition 1(ii) replicates one of the most promi-
nent ndings of the property rights approach, according to which the party
whose investments are more productive should be the owner. However, Propo-
sition 1(iii) shows that this nding crucially relies on the assumption that both
parties have equal bargaining powers. In general, if the bargaining powers of
the parties may di¤er, then it may well be optimal to give ownership to a
party whose investment is less productive, if this party has a relatively weak
bargaining power.
Intuitively, if a party has a very strong ex-post bargaining power and we
want to give both parties su¢ cient incentives to invest, then it makes sense to
give ownership to the other party to improve that partys bargaining position.
As an illustration, see Figures 1 and 2 (where " = 0:5). Figure 1 shows the
total surplus levels when party As investment is more productive ( = 0:6).
Yet, note that if party As bargaining power  is su¢ ciently large (i.e.,  >
0:625), then B-ownership is optimal. Figure 2 analogously depicts the case in
7However, it has been shown that joint ownership can be optimal in a repeated game
setting (Halonen, 2002) or in the presence of asymmetric information (Schmitz, 2008).
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which partyBs investment is more productive ( = 1:6). Nevertheless, if party
As bargaining power is su¢ ciently small (i.e.,  < 0:384), then A-ownership
is optimal.8
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Figure 1. The total surplus levels as functions of party As
bargaining power  when party As investment is more productive
( < 1).
8Observe that if party A (party B) has all the bargaining power, then joint ownership
leads to the same total surplus as ownership by party A (party B). It should also be noted
that if party A (party B) has all the bargaining power and " = 1, then the rst-best surplus
SFB would be attained under ownership by party B (party A).
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Figure 2. The total surplus levels as functions of party As
bargaining power  when party Bs investment is more productive
( > 1).
4 Conclusion
In the property rights approach to the theory of the rm based on incomplete
contracting, parties bargain about whether or not to collaborate after non-
contractible investments have been made. Most contributions to this literature
apply the regular Nash bargaining solution. We explore the implications of
instead using the generalized Nash bargaining solution.
The prominent nding of the property rights literature regarding the sub-
optimality of joint ownership turns out to be robust. However, in contrast to
the standard property rights model, it may well be optimal to give ownership
to a party whose investments are less productive, provided that this partys
ex-post bargaining power is relatively small.
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